Common Information
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| Value |
Domains - T1583.001 |
| Category | Attack-Pattern |
| Type | Mitre-Attack-Pattern |
| Misp Type | Cluster |
| Description | Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| Details | Published | Attributes | CTI | Title | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Details | Website | 2017-03-02 | 149 | Bye Empire, Hello Nebula Exploit Kit. | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-03-01 | 27 | Who Ran Leakedsource.com? – Krebs on Security | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-03-01 | 2 | Red Team Penetration Testing – Going All the Way (Part 2 of 3) | Anitian | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-03-01 | 36 | The Story of an Expired WHOIS Server | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-03-01 | 0 | Optimisation and training techniques for deep learning | the morning paper | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-27 | 297 | The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-23 | 28 | Korean MalDoc Drops Evil New Years Presents | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-23 | 7 | Did you order those iTunes movies? Nope, it’s just phishing for Canadian Apple users | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-23 | 2 | Same-Site cookies against CSRF attacks analysis | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-21 | 21 | Defeating CSRF Protections Through Expired cross-domain.xml Domains | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-20 | 19 | Spam and phishing in 2016 | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-19 | 129 | HookAds Malvertising Redirects to RIG-v EK at 217.107.219.99. EK Drops Ursnif Variant Dreambot. | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-16 | 24 | Cisco Coverage for 'Magic Hound' | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-16 | 72 | menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-16 | 32 | Technical analysis of recent attacks against Polish banks | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-15 | 40 | The Full Shamoon: How the Devastating Malware Was Inserted Into Networks | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-15 | 37 | Highly personalised malspam making extensive use of hijacked domains | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-13 | 7 | WordPress Used as Command and Control Server in 2016 Election Hack | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-12 | 152 | Thousands of Compromised Websites Leading to Fake Flash Player Update Sites. Payload is Qadars Banking Trojan. | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-12 | 53 | Lazarus & Watering-hole attacks | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-08 | 5 | Android Security: A walk-through of SELinux | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-08 | 13 | Go RAT, Go! AthenaGo points “TorWords” Portugal | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-08 | 13 | Go RAT, Go! AthenaGo points “TorWords” Portugal | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-08 | 12 | Fileless attacks against enterprise networks | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-02-08 | 0 | Does the online card payment landscape unwittingly facilitate fraud? | the morning paper |