Common Information
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| Value |
Domains - T1583.001 |
| Category | Attack-Pattern |
| Type | Mitre-Attack-Pattern |
| Misp Type | Cluster |
| Description | Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| Details | Published | Attributes | CTI | Title | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Details | Website | 2017-04-25 | 1 | Internet, We (Still) Have a Problem With Internationalized Domain Names | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-25 | 50 | ShadowWali: New variant of the xxmm family of backdoors | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-24 | 0 | The Necurs Botnet: A Pandora's Box of Malicious Spam | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-21 | 71 | Threat Spotlight: Mighty Morphin Malware Purveyors: Locky Returns Via Necurs | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-21 | 71 | Threat Spotlight: Mighty Morphin Malware Purveyors: Locky Returns Via Necurs | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-21 | 186 | Threat Round-up for Apr 14 - Apr 21 | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-21 | 6 | Decoding React Native creds on Android | Pen Test Partners | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-21 | 0 | Upcoming update with IDN homograph phishing fix | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-20 | 82 | Cardinal RAT Active for Over Two Years | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-19 | 1 | Massive Viagra Botnet Gives Spam Blockers a Hard Time | Imperva | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-19 | 15 | Introducing SSL for SaaS | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-19 | 0 | Personalized Spam and Phishing | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-19 | 12 | Examining a Possible Member of the Winnti Group | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-17 | 70 | Malware spam: "RE: RE: ftc refund" / secretary@ftccomplaintassistant.com | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-16 | 35 | Automating APT Scanning with Loki Scanner and Splunk | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-14 | 4 | Chrome and Firefox Phishing Attack Uses Domains Identical to Known Safe Sites | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-14 | 77 | Cisco Coverage for CVE-2017-0199 | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-11 | 4 | How the FBI Took Down Russia's Spam King---And His Massive Botnet | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-11 | 57 | Breaking the Security Model of Subgraph OS | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-10 | 106 | OpISIS C2’s and Malware? | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-10 | 1 | Justice Department Announces Actions to Dismantle Kelihos Botnet | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-10 | 8 | Endpoint Protection - Symantec Enterprise | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-10 | 1 | How (not) to break your (EC)DSA | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-09 | 6 | Hunting Pastebin with PasteHunter | ||
| Details | Website | 2017-04-07 | 5 | Analysis of the Godzilla Botnet Loader’s Evasive Techniques |