Common Information
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| Value |
Domains - T1583.001 |
| Category | Attack-Pattern |
| Type | Mitre-Attack-Pattern |
| Misp Type | Cluster |
| Description | Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
| Details | Published | Attributes | CTI | Title | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Details | Website | 2008-11-06 | 26 | Yesterday's Obama Spammer Now Imitates Colonial Bank | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-10-31 | 2 | Upcoming conference talks on SELinux applications: sVirt and Kiosk Mode | James Morris | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-10-26 | 42 | Phishing Clue Needed in Ecuador | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-10-12 | 17 | Metasploit WMAP Web Attack and Exploitation | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-09-23 | 32 | Digital Certificate Spammer Goes for Google Adwords | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-09-13 | 7 | Internet Landfills: Praise for Brian Krebs | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-08-22 | 12 | Shadow Botnet case may yield spammer Leni Neto | ||
| Details | Website | 2008-01-11 | 49 | New IRS Virus page taxes users | ||
| Details | Website | 2007-12-27 | 0 | Whitetrash - Dynamic Web White-listing for Squid - Darknet - Hacking Tools, Hacker News & Cyber Security | ||
| Details | Website | 2007-12-04 | 5 | Inside the "Ron Paul" Spam Botnet | ||
| Details | Website | 2007-11-29 | 8 | Russian Malware, Welcome to Texas! | ||
| Details | Website | 2007-11-01 | 21 | Virus Bulletin :: Spam from the kernel | ||
| Details | Website | 2007-09-07 | 0 | Need a job? Don't fall for a scam - Microsoft Security Blog | ||
| Details | Website | 2007-08-22 | 7 | Analyzing Obfuscated Locky Ransomware Downloader | ||
| Details | Website | 2005-11-17 | 1 | Managing Web Browser risks with the NoScript extension | ||
| Details | Website | 2000-01-01 | 21 | Automated Malware Analysis Report for m8XMnec4Vb.elf - Generated by Joe Sandbox | ||
| Details | Website | — | 0 | Protecting parked domains for the UK public sector | ||
| Details | Website | — | 17 | A different type of scam | ||
| Details | Website | — | 82 | UNKNOWN | ||
| Details | Website | — | 32 | UNKNOWN | ||
| Details | Website | — | 57 | UNKNOWN | ||
| Details | Website | — | 49 | UNKNOWN | ||
| Details | Website | — | 88 | UNKNOWN | ||
| Details | Website | — | 30 | UNKNOWN | ||
| Details | Website | — | 0 | Helping secure public sector email with Mail Check |