Common Information
Type Value
Value
Domains - T1583.001
Category Attack-Pattern
Type Mitre-Attack-Pattern
Misp Type Cluster
Description Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Details Published Attributes CTI Title
Details Website 2013-10-31 40 Inside a (The?) Simda Affiliate : Партнёрка Podmena (formerly Chesto)
Details Website 2013-10-25 57 IGF 2013: Analyzing Content Controls in Indonesia
Details Website 2013-10-23 29 Paunch's arrest...The end of an Era !
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Details Website 2013-10-07 82 ...And (again!) ZeroAccess/Sirefef is NOT Dead (yet!)
Details Website 2013-09-28 3 In computers, are random numbers really random? | Malwarebytes Labs
Details Website 2013-09-25 38
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Details Website 2013-08-08 0 Offensive Operations Training & Certifications | SANS Institute
Details Website 2013-08-05 17 Worm.Gamarue – What it is and How does it Evolve?
Details Website 2013-08-01 38 Analysis of malicious advertisements on telegraaf.nl
Details Website 2013-07-19 0 Simplifying Security for Mobile Networks
Details Website 2013-07-08 4 Styx Exploit Pack: Domo Arigato, PC Roboto – Krebs on Security
Details Website 2013-06-25 4 Developers - Veil - AV Evasion
Details Website 2013-06-24 1 Dynamically Generated Kryptik Fast Flux Domains and How to Detect Them
Details Website 2013-06-20 1 Swiss Cyber Storm 4 – part 1
Details Website 2013-06-20 84 O Pakistan, We Stand on Guard for Thee: An Analysis of Canada-based Netsweeper’s Role in Pakistan’s Censorship Regime
Details Website 2013-06-19 7 Performing Automated Network Reconnaissance with Recon-NG