Common Information
Type | Value |
---|---|
Value |
Domains - T1583.001 |
Category | Attack-Pattern |
Type | Mitre-Attack-Pattern |
Misp Type | Cluster |
Description | Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
Details | Published | Attributes | CTI | Title | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Details | Website | 2020-02-21 | 435 | Threat Roundup for February 14 to February 21 | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-20 | 6 | CSI: Evidence Indicators for Targeted Ransomware Attacks - Part II | McAfee Blog | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-20 | 37 | ObliqueRAT: New RAT hits victims' endpoints via malicious documents | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-20 | 0 | DigiCert's Position on 1-Year TLS SSL Certificates | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-20 | 28 | Post-mortem of a targeted Sodinokibi ransomware attack | Darktrace Blog | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-18 | 41 | Building a bypass with MSBuild | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-18 | 13 | Tracking ‘Kimsuky’, the North Korea-based cyber espionage group: Part 1 | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-17 | 48 | “The Turkish Rat” Evolved Adwind in a Massive Ongoing Phishing Campaign - Check Point Research | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-17 | 5 | 2nd January – Threat Intelligence Report – Check Point Research | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-17 | 15 | 12th December – Threat Intelligence Report – Check Point Research | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-17 | 42 | BlindEagle Targeting Ecuador With Sharpened Tools – Check Point Research | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-14 | 484 | Threat Roundup for February 7 to February 14 | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-13 | 95 | Threat actors attempt to capitalize on coronavirus outbreak | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-13 | 35 | New Cyber Espionage Campaigns Targeting Palestinians - Part 1: The Spark Campaign | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-13 | 56 | Playing defense against Gamaredon Group | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-12 | 45 | Loda RAT Grows Up | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-10 | 47 | Suspected Sapphire Mushroom (APT-C-12) malicious LNK files | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-10 | 29 | KBOT: sometimes they come back | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-07 | 37 | Emotet Technical Analysis - Part 2 PowerShell Unveiled | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-07 | 394 | Threat Roundup for January 31 to February 7 | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-07 | 11 | Magecart Group 12’s Latest: Actors Behind Cyberattacks on Olympics Ticket Re-sellers Deftly Swapped Domains to Continue Campaign | RiskIQ | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-06 | 0 | Top Attacks Against Service Providers 2017-2019 | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-06 | 24 | DNS tunneling series, part 3: The siren song of RogueRobin | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-05 | 191 | STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics | Mandiant | ||
Details | Website | 2020-02-05 | 44 | Pro-Russian CyberSpy Gamaredon Intensifies Ukrainian Security Targeting - SentinelLabs |