恶意样本分析手册——理论篇 – 绿盟科技技术博客
Common Information
Type Value
UUID 6e53d4b3-fa32-4775-b6be-638c9ad38b2c
Fingerprint a54ba74e588f603
Analysis status DONE
Considered CTI value 0
Text language
Published March 28, 2017, 9:23 p.m.
Added to db Jan. 18, 2023, 7:37 p.m.
Last updated Nov. 17, 2024, 5:58 p.m.
Headline 恶意样本分析手册——理论篇
Title 恶意样本分析手册——理论篇 – 绿盟科技技术博客
Detected Hints/Tags/Attributes 37/1/38
Attributes
Details Type #Events CTI Value
Details File 2
windows.inc
Details File 1
索引值在windows.inc
Details File 1
后半部分是osloader.exe
Details File 1
su解析osloader.exe
Details File 1
e820frame.key
Details File 1
循环条件是e820frame.key
Details File 1
后面无法加载osloader.exe
Details File 1
oloader.exe
Details File 6
osloader.exe
Details File 1
即osloader.exe
Details File 1
首先需要解析osloader.exe
Details File 1
复制完成后返回osloader.exe
Details File 1
实际上就是跳转到osloader.exe
Details File 2
当user32.dll
Details File 50
a.exe
Details File 1
想要调用b.dll
Details File 1
这样的话我们把b.dll
Details File 1
改名bb.dll
Details File 1
然后我们自己写一个b.dll
Details File 1
然后我们在这个函数里加载bb.dll
Details File 1
原b.dll
Details File 1
对于a.exe
Details File 1
也就是b.dll
Details File 1
就是先在主程序目录下查找b.dll
Details File 1
就要知道b.dll
Details File 125
ntoskrnl.exe
Details File 291
user32.dll
Details File 229
advapi32.dll
Details File 1
最终都封装在ntdll.dll
Details File 1
可以获得由ntoskrnl.exe
Details File 1
具体存在于win32k.sys
Details File 1
messagebox的函数的实现过程实际上是在user32.dll
Details File 1
当这个程序运行时会在user32.dll
Details File 1
比如我们的一个驱动程序导入了psgetcurrentprocessid这个ntkrnlpa.exe
Details File 1
装载程序会确定ntkrnlpa.exe
Details File 22
ntkrnlpa.exe
Details File 1
+ntkrnlpa.exe
Details File 1
dbg会使用自带的loaddll.exe