Common Information
Type Value
Value
Launch Daemon - T1160
Category Attack-Pattern
Type Mitre-Enterprise-Attack-Attack-Pattern
Misp Type Cluster
Description Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. Detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application. Platforms: macOS Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring Effective Permissions: root Permissions Required: Administrator
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